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Grover: Casenote--State v. Williams

DELINQUENCY AND PUNISHMENT: THE IMPACT OF STATE V.
WILLIAMS ON JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION IN
OHIO
Amy Grover*

The juvenile justice system was founded upon the notion that children
who commit acts that would be crimes if committed by adults are
different than adults who engage in the same behaviors.1 This
distinction led to the establishment of a distinct court system for
juveniles that focused on rehabilitating youth rather than punishing
them, with an ultimate goal of guiding them “toward life
as . . . responsible, law-abiding adult[s].”2 However, recent federal and
state laws that require youth who are adjudicated delinquent in juvenile
courts to register as sex offenders are more punitive than rehabilitative,
and actually can deter children who commit sex offenses from later
becoming productive members of society.3 In State v. Williams, the
Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that these registration
requirements were punitive,4 and effectively admitted that Ohio’s
juvenile justice system has been punishing juvenile sex offenders
instead of rehabilitating them.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in State v. Williams has
significantly impacted the way the law approaches sex offender
registration.5 Prior to the court’s decision, Ohio considered sex offender
registration laws to be a primarily remedial measure rather than a
punitive restriction.6 However, the court determined that new
amendments to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950 had made the
registration requirements primarily punitive, therefore making

* Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. ABA Division for Public Education,THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIALOGUE ON
YOUTH
AND
JUSTICE
5
(2007)
,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJfull.authcheckdam.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See generally JUSTICE POLICY INST., REGISTERING HARM: HOW SEX OFFENSE REGISTRIES
FAIL YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES 5 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/0811_RPT_WalshActRegisteringHarm_JJ-PS.pdf.
4. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011).
5. Id.
6. See State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 758 (Ohio 2010); State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110,
117 (Ohio 2008).
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retroactive application of the law unconstitutional.7
Punitive classification of sex offender registration laws will likely
have remarkable implications for juvenile sex offender registration
requirements in Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the
prohibition on retroactive application of these requirements applies to
juveniles as well as adults.8 However, because the dispositions of
juvenile delinquents are meant to be primarily rehabilitative, not
punitive, juvenile defenders in Ohio should argue against the
prospective imposition of punitive registration requirements on juvenile
sex offenders as well.
Part II of this Comment will examine the emerging trend in United
States Supreme Court decisions of recognizing the differences between
adults and children, along with the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile
justice system. Part III will provide an overview of the current state of
sex offender registration in Ohio, including the requirements for both
adult and juvenile offenders. In Part IV, this Comment will discuss the
Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Williams. Finally, Part V
will explain why juvenile sex offender registration requirements are
both invalid and in violation of the Due Process Clause when the recent
decisions the Supreme Courts of the United States and Ohio are
considered. The limited protective value of these requirements does not
justify the extreme intrusion into the youth’s life and privacy created by
registration laws. Requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders is
ineffective, anti-rehabilitative, and unconstitutional.
II. RECOGNIZING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHILDREN AND ADULTS
Anyone who has ever known a child or adolescent can say without
question that juveniles and adults are physically, cognitively, and
emotionally different. The United States Supreme Court has also
recently recognized this fact, and, using psychological research
regarding adolescent development, has made several alterations to the
criminal law to account for these variances. However, the differences
between children and adults have long been recognized in the American
justice system through the juvenile court system and the civil, rather
than criminal, ramifications of its decisions. Juvenile court was founded
on the principle of rehabilitation, not punishment, and therefore its
adjudications are intended to help transform children into productive
members of society rather than punish children for their wrongdoing.

7. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113.
8. In re D.J.S., 957 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio 2011).
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A. The Trend of Supreme Court Decisions Altering Criminal Law for
Juveniles
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized the differences between children and adult in its decisions,
and allowed for concessions or changes in criminal law based solely on
the juvenile status of the defendants. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court
discussed three general differences between children and adults, which it
used to justify the abolition of the death penalty for children on the
grounds that it was cruel and unusual punishment.9
The Court’s first observation was that children exhibit “a lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that often leads
to “impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”10 In other
words, due to their immaturity, juveniles tend to act impulsively and are
unable to consider fully the possible consequences of their actions.
Children typically make decisions based on their instinct, instead of
engaging in the cost–benefit analysis most responsible adults
subconsciously consider before making most of their choices.
Secondly, the Court concluded that children are “more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure.”11 Because juveniles are less secure in their individual
identities, it is much easier for them to get swept into whatever activities
in which their peers are engaging.12 In the same vein, other people’s
opinions influence them to a greater extent.
Finally, the Court recognized that “the character of a juvenile is not as
well formed as that of an adult,” meaning that a child’s personality traits
are “more transitory, less fixed.”13 A juvenile’s personality is not set in
stone; rather, it is constantly in the process of being formed. Every
outside force with which a child comes into contact and every
experience that child goes through contributes to the shaping of his or
her personality, conscience, and character.14
Taking these differences into consideration, the Court concluded that
“[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably deprived character,”15 that “a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Aaron M. White, The Changing Adolescent Brain, EDUC. CAN., Spring 2005, at 6.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (emphasis added).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 7

294

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

reformed,”16 and children have “diminished culpability” in any crime
they might commit.17 Recognizing that because children’s immense
capability to be rehabilitated and the limited culpability in children’s
actions render it nearly impossible for even the wisest and most capable
of psychiatrists to pick out the rare juvenile offender who is completely
beyond rehabilitation, the Court concluded that it is unconstitutional to
determine that an attempt at rehabilitation would be in vain and sentence
a child to death.18
The Court also considered the differences between adults and children
in Graham v. Florida, where it concluded that life without parole was
cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders convicted of
nonhomicide crimes.19 In determining that life without parole for
nonhomicide juvenile offenders was not justified by the retributive value
of the sentence, the Court looked to the psychological conclusions
underlying the holding in Roper, specifically the diminished culpability
of juvenile offenders.20 Finding that life without parole did not provide
juveniles with a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation, the Court
held that it was an inappropriate and unconstitutional sentence for youth
who committed nonhomicide crimes.21
Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expanded its
holding in Graham to find that the Eighth Amendment also forbids
sentencing laws that require juvenile offenders to receive a sentence of
life without parole for committing homicide.22 Looking to the Graham
factors, the Court concluded that “[s]uch a scheme prevents those
meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s lessened
culpability and greater capacity for change.”23 While youth who
commit homicide may still receive life without parole, the sentencing
court must be able to determine whether “his youth and its attendant
characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser
sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more
appropriate.”24
The Supreme Court has also looked to the Roper factors to inform its
analysis in other areas of criminal law. In J.B.D. v. North Carolina, the
Court acknowledged the widespread acceptance of these deductions,

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 573.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
Id. at 2028.
Id. at 2030.
Miller v. Alabama, No. 10-9646, slip. op. at 2 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
Id. at 1.
Id.
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going so far as referring to them as “commonsense conclusions.”25 The
Court observed that “[t]he law has historically reflected the same
assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise
mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand
the world around them,”26 and reiterated many previous statements that
explained “what any parent knows”27: children are not miniature
adults.28 Considering the differences between adults and children, the
Court concluded that age should be considered when determining for
Miranda purposes the reasonableness of a person’s belief that he or she
was in custody, even though other subjective factors are not permitted to
be considered.29
These four decisions illustrate the Court’s recognition of the key
differences between juveniles and adults; namely, that juveniles make
less cognizant decisions, are less culpable for their actions, and have a
greater susceptibility to rehabilitation; and that because of these
differences, juvenile offenders should receive different treatment and
punishment than adult offenders do. In all four of these cases, the
Supreme Court repeatedly chose to alter well-established criminal law
principles in order to address more appropriately the unique situation of
the juvenile offender.
B. The Rehabilitative Purpose of the Juvenile Justice System
Although the Supreme Court has expressly recognized the differences
between adults and children only recently, the juvenile justice system
has treated children differently than the criminal justice system treats
adults since separate courts were established for children.30 The system
was established to provide juveniles with rehabilitative, rather than
punitive, dispositions.31 The chapter in the Ohio Revised Code on
juvenile delinquency states that “[t]he overriding purposes for
dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection,
and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter,
protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for
the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender.”

25. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011).
26. Id.
27. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
28. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. at 2403.
29. Id. at 2405.
30. Jessica E. Brown, Note, Classifying Juveniles “Among the Worst Offenders”: Utilizing
Roper v. Simmons to Challenge Registration and Notification Requirements for Adolescent Sex
Offenders, 39 STETSON L. REV. 369, 370 (2010).
31. Id.
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Even though the Code does mention holding the offender accountable
for his actions, the primary concern of the juvenile justice system is to
rehabilitate the offender and restore him as a productive member of the
community.33 The Supreme Court of Ohio itself noted this distinction,
and recently concluded that “[j]uvenile delinquency proceedings are
civil rather than criminal in character,”34 and “[j]uvenile courts are
unique and are tied to the goal of rehabilitation.”35 In examining the
differences between juvenile dispositions and criminal sentences to
determine what due process protections must be provided to a youth
who was given a blended sentence, the court in State v. D.H. also
emphasized that “[t]he purposes of felony sentencing, on the other
hand, ‘are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others and to punish the offender.’”36
Additionally, because juvenile delinquency hearings are considered
civil and not criminal proceedings, children are not afforded all of the
same rights given to adults in criminal trials.37 Among the procedural
rights denied to children in their delinquency hearings is the right to a
trial by jury.38 Rather, juvenile delinquency cases are heard in bench
trials, and a child’s disposition is determined by a judge, without the
procedural protection of a jury.39 Since juvenile delinquents are not
afforded the full due process of law required in adult criminal
proceedings, it is even more important to focus juvenile dispositions on
rehabilitating the child and not on punishing the child for his or her
actions.
III. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
Ohio Sex offender registration requirements are based on adaptations
of the Federal legislation. Federal law itself does not distinguish
between juvenile and criminal offenders. Likewise, in Ohio, juvenile
delinquents may be subject to the same registration requirements as
criminal defendants. Juvenile offenders may be ordered to register
under the registration requirements of any of the three tiers created by
the Adam Walsh Act, or under the restrictions of the uniquely juvenile
category of Public Registry-Qualified Juvenile Offender Registrant.
32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.01 (West 2012).
33. Cope v. Campbell, 196 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ohio 1964) (overruled in part by In re Agler, 249
N.E.2d 808 (Ohio 1969)).
34. In re A.J.S., 897 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Ohio 2008).
35. State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209, 216 (Ohio 2009).
36. Id. at 217 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11(A) (West 2011)).
37. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 25.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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A. Criminal Registration Requirements
Congress passed “Megan’s Law” in 1994 in response to the rape and
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka. The bill demanded that every
state create a registry for violent and child sex offenders to avoid losing
ten percent of its funding under Section 506 of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3765).40 In 1996,
Congress amended the law to require states to inform citizens of
registered sex offenders in their neighborhoods.41
In 2006, Congress increased its demands on the states by passing the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act in commemoration of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of six-year-old Adam Walsh’s abduction and
murder.42 The Act classified sex offenders into three different tiers
based on their offense, 43 increased registration requirements,44 and
established a national sex offender registry.45 It also required states to
adopt the title within three years of the enactment in order to maintain
their current level of funding.46 These requirements were established
“[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against
children and in response to vicious attacks by violent predators.” 47
Ohio adopted Megan’s Law through Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio
Laws, Part II, 2560 in 1996, and the requirements were significantly
amended in 2003 by Am. Sub. S.B. 5 (S.B. 5) 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV,
6558.48 The state legislature subsequently implemented the Adam
Walsh Act through Am. Sub. S.B. 10 (S.B. 10) in 2007.49 Both
adoptions amended Chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code to comply
with the federal requirements.50
B. Juvenile Registration Requirements
Under Ohio law, certain juvenile sex offenders are also required to
comply with the registration requirements of O.R.C. Chapter 2950. S.B.

40. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND.
L.J. 315, 316 (2001).
41. Id.
42. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Public Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 2, 120
Stat. 587, 589 (2006).
43. Id. § 111.
44. Id. § 117.
45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 124–25.
47. Id. § 102.
48. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ohio 2011).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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10 divides juvenile sex offenders into the three tiers created in the Adam
Walsh Act.51 It also establishes a fourth category for the Public
Registry-Qualified Juvenile Offender Registrant (PRQJOR), which
places a child on the online sex offender registry.52 Additionally, the
bill requires that juvenile courts automatically classify children who
commit certain sex offenses and receive a Serious Youthful Offender
sentence as both Tier III offenders and PRQJORs.53 However, the
Supreme Court of Ohio recently determined that the automatic
classification of such youth constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
making O.R.C. § 2152.86 unconstitutional.54
Accordingly, this
Comment will not further discuss PRQJOR status.
All children who are sixteen or seventeen at the time they commit
their offense must be classified as juvenile offender registrants.55
Furthermore, juvenile offenders aged fourteen through seventeen at the
time they commit an offense are required to register if they have been
adjudicated delinquent for committing a sex offense or a child–victim
offense before.56 This requirement exists without regard to how long
ago the child committed his or her first offense or to the child’s age at
the time of the first offense.57 These registration requirements are
mandatory, and there is no discretion left to the judge to determine
whether or not registration is necessary based on the potential
dangerousness of the juvenile or his or her likelihood to reoffend.58
However, juvenile courts do have discretion to decide which tier is the
appropriate classification for non-PRQJOR youth, including mandatory
registrants.59
In addition to creating mandatory juvenile registrants, the Code also
gives judges the discretion to determine that some first-time offenders
who were fourteen or fifteen at the time of their offense should be
required to register.60 The factors that judges are required to consider
include the nature of the offense committed by the child, whether the
child has displayed any genuine remorse for the offense, the welfare and
safety of the general public, the results of any treatment provided to the
child and of any follow-up professional assessment of the child, and
51. JUVENILE DIVISION, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER, OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE PROVISIONS OF
SENATE BILL 10, at 2.
52. Id.
53. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.86 (West 2012).
54. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012).
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.83 (West 2012).
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.82 (West 2012).
57. JUVENILE DIVISION, supra note 51, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2.
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.83 (West 2012).
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several other factors regarding the child, offense, and victim.61 If the
court determines that the child should register, it must also hold a tier
classification hearing as it would for a mandatory registrant.62
Tier classification impacts the length of time children must register,
how often they must register, and the public availability of their
information. Tier I juvenile offender registrants must register annually
for ten years unless they are judicially declassified.63 Tier II sex
offenders are required to register every 180 days for twenty years unless
they are declassified.64 Finally, Tier III offenders are required to
register every 90 days for life unless they are declassified.65 A court can
also choose to subject a Tier III juvenile offender registrant to
community notification requirements.66 However, the registration
information for any juvenile offender registrant is public record open for
public inspection.67
IV. STATE V. WILLIAMS
Although Ohio law requires juvenile sex offenders to follow the
above registration requirements, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision
in State v. Williams brings the constitutionality of these laws into serious
question. In Williams, the court considered the retroactive application of
sex offender registration requirements to George Williams, who was
indicted in November 2007 for unlawful sexual contact with a minor.68
Although Ohio’s version of the federal “Megan’s Law,”69 as amended
by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”) was the statutory scheme for sex
offender classification and registration in effect at the time Williams
committed the offense, as well as the time when he entered his plea,70
Williams was sentenced under the harsher requirements of the Ohio
version of the Adam Walsh Act,71 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B.
10”).72 Under S.B. 10, Williams was subject to additional reporting and
registration requirements and was subject to those requirements for a

61. Id.
62. JUVENILE DIVISION, supra note 51, at 2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id.
68. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (Ohio 2011).
69. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
70. Williams, 954 N.E.2d at 1110.
71. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Public Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (2006).
72. Williams, 954 N.E.2d at 1109.
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longer period of time than he would have been under S.B. 5.73
According to his sentence, under S.B. 10 he was required to:
[R]egister in person in the county in which he resided, in the county in
which he was being educated, and in the county in which he was
employed, to provide written notice within three days of any change of
vehicle information, e-mail addresses, Internet identifiers or telephone
numbers, and to verify the addresses for a period of 25 years with in
74
person verification every 180 days.

Williams appealed the retroactive application of these requirements to
his sentence, arguing that the law did not go into effect until January 1,
2008, and therefore, could not be applied to him because of Ohio’s
constitutional ban on the retroactive application of substantive laws.75
After reviewing Ohio’s jurisprudence regarding the retroactive
application of laws, the court applied a two-prong test.76 First, the court
determined whether or not “the General Assembly expressly made the
statute retroactive.”77 The court concluded that S.B. 10 was intended to
apply retroactively because Revised Code § 2950.03 imposed
registration requirements on offenders who were sentenced on or after
January 1, 2008 without any regard to when the offense was
committed.78 The court then examined the second prong of the
retroactivity test, which asks whether the statute was substantive or
remedial.79
According to Ohio Supreme Court precedent, the Constitutional ban
on retroactive laws applies only to substantive, not remedial, laws.80
Ohio law defines a substantive statute as a law that “impairs or takes
away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or
additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past
transaction, or creates a new right.”81 Remedial laws, on the other hand,
affect only the actual remedy provided and “include laws that merely
substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an
existing right.”82
In previous cases regarding sex offender registration, the court had
held that the requirements of “R.C. Chapter 2950 serve[d] the solely

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (Ohio 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1110 (citing Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988)).
Id. at 1110–11.
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remedial purpose of protecting the public,” 83 and that “R.C. Chapter
2950 is a civil, remedial statute.” 84 Therefore, retroactive application of
sex offender registration requirements had never been considered to
violate the Ohio Constitution, as they were considered to be an
alternative remedy for protecting the community rather than an
additional burden on sex offenders. However, these conclusions about
the remedial nature of R.C. Chapter 2950 were all made before the
revisions of S.B. 10.
After reviewing the amendments in S.B. 10, the court determined that
“the statutory scheme has changed dramatically since this court
described the registration process imposed on sex offenders as an
inconvenience comparable to renewing a driver’s license” and that “it
has changed markedly since this court concluded . . . that R.C. Chapter
2950 was remedial.”85 Several differences between S.B. 5 and S.B. 10
led the court to conclude that “all of the changes enacted by S.B. 10 in
aggregate” had transformed Chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code
from remedial to punitive.86 Those differences were: (1) Williams’
classification as a Tier II sex offender based entirely on the offense he
committed without a hearing and “without regard to the circumstances
of the crime or his likelihood to reoffend”;87 (2) the mandatory, rather
than discretionary, nature of his registration requirements;88 and (3) the
extension of his registration period from ten to twenty-five years.89 The
court was also swayed by the fact that the new system no longer
permitted sex offenders to challenge their classifications.90 Ultimately,
the court held in forceful and conclusive language that “[f]ollowing the
enactment of S.B. 10, all doubt has been removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is
punitive.”91
Therefore, due to the punitive nature of the amended Chapter 2950,
the court concluded that it was “no longer convinced that R.C. Chapter
2950 is remedial, even though some elements of it remain remedial,”
and therefore that “as to a sex offender whose crime was committed
prior to the enactment of S.B. 10, the act imposes new or additional
burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction and
create[s] new burdens, new duties, new obligations, or new liabilities

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 585 (Ohio 1998).
State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110,120 (Ohio 2008).
State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011).
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1112 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01(E)–(G) (West 2012)).
Id. at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04(A)(2) (West 2012)).
Id. at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.07(B)(2) (West 2012)).
Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.06(B) (West 2012)).
Id. at 1112 (emphasis added).
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not existing at the time.”92 Because S.B. 10 qualified as a substantive,
rather than remedial, law, the court determined that the law’s retroactive
application to Williams was unconstitutional, and it remanded the case
for resentencing.93
V. DISCUSSION
Although sex offender registration was created to provide children
with protection from rape and even murder at the hand of dangerous
criminals, it actually does very little to keep children safe. Requiring
juvenile offenders to register is even less effective than adult
registration, as most youth who commit sex crimes pose a minimal
threat to society. In reality, sex offender registration requirements cause
significant harm to the lives of juvenile sex offenders, and might even
increase their chance of reoffending. Not only is registration damaging
and ineffective, but it is also inconsistent with the rehabilitative
methodology of the juvenile justice system and denies youth their
constitutionally-mandated right to due process of law.
A. Registration is an Ineffective Means of Protecting Potential Victims
Despite significant criticism of both Megan’s Law and the Adam
Walsh Act, adult sex offender registration requirements maintain their
popularity with the public because of society’s fear of the “sexual
predator,” and maintain legislative approval because of tremendous
pressure from the public.94 Lawmakers view sex offender registration
requirements as protective, and the government considers the violation
of the sex offenders’ rights to privacy to be less important than its
interest in protecting children from what the community perceives to be
dangerous criminals “who prey on children.”95 The public also justifies
this devaluation of the rights of convicted sex offenders because
proponents of registration laws have worked to dehumanize sex
offenders, portraying them as “lions in the tall grass waiting to attack,”96
“monsters,”97 “beast[s],”98 and even “the human equivalent of toxic

92. Id. at 1113.
93. Id at 1113.
94. See, e.g., Mark A. Palmer, Sexual Predators, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at A16.
95. Id.
96. Don McPherson, The myth of the ‘monster’ pedophile, CNN, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-08/opinion/opinion_mcpherson-pedophiles_1_prevention-of-sexualabuse-sexual-predators-jerry-sandusky?_s=PM:OPINION.
97. Id.
98. Filler, supra note 40, at 339.
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waste.”99 When sex offenders are portrayed in such an animalistic and
predatory light, it is easy to see why registration requirements maintain
both public and legislative support.
However, studies have shown that sex offender registration laws do
very little to prevent violent sexual crimes. In fact, many opponents of
the Adam Walsh Act maintain that registration laws are “ill-considered,
poorly crafted, and may cause more harm than good.”100 The legislation
was designed based on the idea that, because sex offenders often
continually hunt for and prey on random children,101 registration can
help parents and law enforcement officials protect these children.102
However, the truth of the matter is that three out of four sex offenders
do not recidivate, and approximately 90% of sex crimes against children
are committed by someone the child knows and trusts.103
Although research supports the conclusion that the sexual predator is
almost entirely a myth,104 juvenile sex offenders are even less likely to
recidivate than adult offenders.105 It has been established that
adolescent cognitive functions are different than those of adults, and
juvenile sex offenders are no different from other adolescents.
According to Dan Knoepfler, President of the Washington Association
for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, “A common misperception is that
they’re like adults. But they’re not. We’re mainly talking about geeky,
nerdy, socially immature kids.”106
Research also suggests that juvenile sex offenders are more amenable
to treatment than adult offenders due to their continuing psychological
development, and therefore are more likely to be rehabilitated.107 When
provided with proper treatment, juvenile offenders rarely commit sex
offenses as adults.108 One explanation for this difference is that juvenile
sex offenders exhibit lower frequencies of more extreme forms of sexual
aggression, fantasy, and compulsivity than adult offenders.109 They also
99. Id. at 340.
100. HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 3 (2007).
101. See id. at 4 (“Some politicians cite recidivism rates for sex offenders that are as high as 80–
90 percent.”).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See generally Don McPherson, The myth of the ‘monster’ pedophile, CNN, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-08/opinion/opinion_mcpherson-pedophiles_1_prevention-of-sexualabuse-sexual-predators-jerry-sandusky?_s=PM:OPINION.
105. NATIONAL CENTER ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH, WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT
ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003).
106. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20.
107. ASSOCIATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, THE EFFECTIVE LEGAL
MANAGEMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS (2000).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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show lower levels of consistency in deviant arousal and are “more fluid
in their sexual interests and patterns of behaviors than adults.”110
Finally, very few juvenile offenders exhibit the same long-term
tendencies to commit sexual offenses as chronic adult offenders.111 The
majority of their offenses are the result of nonsexual feelings, and they
rarely eroticize aggression as repeat adult offenders do.112 Juvenile sex
offenders, therefore, very rarely fall into the already narrow definition of
“sexual predators.”
Juvenile registration laws are also “based on an assumption that
adjudicated sex offenders differ in important and lasting ways from
other delinquents and teens in general,” and accordingly pose a great
risk to society because of their likelihood to commit additional sex
offenses.113
However, these public policies are “grounded in
questionable or inaccurate assumptions about the risk of juvenile sexual
recidivism.”114 In fact, juvenile sex offenders are less likely to reoffend
than other juvenile delinquents.115 As illustrated by a recent study of
over 11,000 juvenile delinquents, the recidivism rate among sex
offenders was only 7.08%, whereas the general recidivism rate was
43.4%.116 Many statistical studies have shown that over nine out ten
juveniles who are arrested for a sex offense never commit a sex crime
again.117
Because juveniles are still in the process of developing their sexual
tendencies, they are highly responsive to sex offender treatment and
likely to pose no future threat to society.118 They pose less risk of
reoffending than adult sex offenders119
and other juvenile
delinquents.120
Requiring youth to comply with sex offender
registration requirements is therefore a highly ineffective method of
protecting children from sexual abuse.

110. John A. Hunter, Jr. et al., The Relationship Between Phallometrically Measured Deviant
Sexual Arousal and Clinical Characteristics in Juvenile Sexual Offenders, 32 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY
533, 537 (1994).
111. NATIONAL CENTER ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH, WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT
ADOLESCENT SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2003).
112. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20.
113. Michael F. Caldwell, Study Characteristics and Recidivism Base Rates in Juvenile Sex
Offender Recidivism, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 197, 198 (2010).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 201–02.
116. Id.
117. JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 20.
118. ASSOCIATION FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, THE EFFECTIVE LEGAL
MANAGEMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS 2 (2000).
119. Id.
120. Caldwell, supra note 113, at 202.
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B. Registration Causes Unnecessary Harm to Juvenile Sex Offenders
Sex offender registration has a profound impact on the life of a child.
Being on the registry alienates the child and creates barriers between the
child and the educational, employment, housing, and treatment
opportunities that are likely to reduce the likelihood of reoffending.121
Neurological studies have shown that adolescents are “especially
vulnerable to the stigma and isolation that registration and notification
create,”122 and because youth who are labeled as a “sex offender” label
often experience rejection from peer groups and adults, they are less
likely to attach to social institutions like schools and churches.123 This
lack of attachment is detrimental to the juvenile’s rehabilitation and
development.124 In addition, the pain, guilt, and rejection caused by
registry requirements increases the youth’s risk of suicide.125
Placement on the registry also reveals a child’s personal information
to the public, putting the child at risk of harm from vigilante actions by
members of the community.126 One study conducted at the University
of Louisville concluded that 47%of registered sex offenders surveyed
had been harassed in person, 28% had received threatening phone calls,
and 16% had been assaulted.127 Because adolescent brains are “sculpted
by [their] interactions with the outside world,” 128 and are therefore more
likely to internalize this harassment, the publication of their personal
information can cause both physical and emotional damage to youth.129
Requiring a juvenile to register also places stressors and limitation on
the youth that might lead him or her to reoffend or commit other
nonsexual crimes.130 Many studies have shown the connection between
lack of access to education, employment, housing, and treatment and
criminal activity.131 Research also indicates that the ostracism felt by
registered offenders and the difficulties they have in finding
employment and housing increase the stress felt by a juvenile who has
been released from a facility.132 This stress can trigger new offenses as

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Aaron M. White, The Changing Adolescent Brain, EDUC. CAN., Spring 2005, at 6.
JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24–25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.
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a coping mechanism.133 Registration requirements alienate juveniles
from “the very opportunities that are likely to reduce the likelihood of
future offending.”134 Therefore, although they are intended to protect
children from victimization, juvenile sex offender registration
requirements actually victimize the children who must comply with
them and prevent youth from joining the ranks of productive society.
C. Registration is Punitive and Therefore is Not an Appropriate Juvenile
Disposition

Based on both the history of the juvenile justice system and the
policies recently espoused by both the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Ohio, the juvenile justice system is
primarily focused on working to rehabilitate the children who fall
under its jurisdiction. Because children are emotionally and
psychologically different than adults, their actions are less culpable
than those of adults and they are more likely to be rehabilitated.
Dispositions, therefore, should not be doled out as a punishment for
wrongdoing or a deterrent of future crime. Rather, courts should
focus on providing the disposition that will most effectively allow the
child to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society as a productive
and contributing member.
In State v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that all
doubt had been removed as to the punitive nature of sex offender
registration requirements: sex offender registration requirements
under S.B. 10 are punishment. Even though the Supreme Court of
Ohio has already held that the punitive nature of the statutory
requirements do not allow for ex post facto application of registration
requirements to juveniles, the fact that registration is a punitive
scheme has much broader implications. Because juvenile courts are
rehabilitative in nature, they should be prohibited from imposing a
punitive sentence such as requiring a juvenile to register as a sex
offender.
The penalties imposed by sex offender registration are especially
oppressive to juvenile offenders. Although the requirements are not
substantively different, children are more likely to internalize the
societal stigmatization that is inseparable from registration as a sex
offender because they are more sensitive to the views of others.
Juvenile offenders begin to see themselves in the same distorted light
that members of society do and begin to believe that they are the

133. Id.
134. Id.
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predator everyone seems to think that they are.135
This stigmatization, however, goes beyond punishment; it is
actually anti-rehabilitative. Because juveniles who are forced to
comply with sex offender registration requirements can be denied
educational and vocational opportunities, it is more difficult for them
to become productive members of society. Walking around with the
shame of sex offender status not only constrains children’s selfesteem and shapes their self-perception, but it also limits their
rehabilitative options.136
Although the purpose of the juvenile justice system is to take
juvenile delinquents—who have a diminished culpability for their
criminal acts and an immense capacity for rehabilitation and
training—and transform them into capable adults, sex offender
registration requirements impose restrictions on young offenders that
inhibit their ability to embrace a reformed life. A system that intends
to assist cannot assign punishment that leads to the offender’s
societal regression, hinders personal change and growth, and could
even drive the young registrant to reoffend. Sex offender registration
not only flouts the rehabilitative spirit of the juvenile justice system,
but it actually debilitates the ex-delinquents who are subject to it.
The harmful effects of juvenile sex offender registration seem even
more inexcusable when faced with the reality of extremely low rates of
recidivism among youth who commit sex crimes. The Adam Walsh
Act’s registration and notification requirements were founded on the
idea that sex offenders are crazed deviants who cannot resist reoffending
and prey on the weak and helpless. However, the fact that very few
juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for a sexual offense go on to
commit another sex crime completely annihilates the argument that
registration is necessary for public protection. These juveniles are not
predators, and studies have shown that they can be rehabilitated.
However, subjecting them to harsh, punitive registration requirements
and the societal stigma that accompanies the label “sex offender” can
actually interfere with their rehabilitation.

135. See Mike S. Adams et. al., Labeling and Delinquency, 38 ADOLESCENCE 149, Spring 2003,
at 184 (“negative labels . . . can lead to the adoption of a deviant self-concept”); Hollida Wakefield, The
Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Increase Recidivism and Sexual
Violence? 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 141, 145 (2006) (“former prisoners
who perceive opportunities are blocked may develop a sense of hopelessness”).
136. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 3, at 24.
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D. Imposing Punitive Registration Requirements Violates a Juvenile’s
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law
Although juveniles charged as delinquents are not afforded all of the
rights of criminal defendants, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the Due Process Clause requires a delinquency hearing
to “measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”137
As Justice Fortas famously pronounced in the Court’s landmark decision
in In re Gault, which held that juveniles have due process rights to
notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination, “[u]nder our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court.”138
However, juveniles have been denied several important procedural
protections of criminal trials, including the right to trial by jury.139 In
holding that juvenile delinquency hearings did not require a jury trial,
the Supreme Court reasoned that “a juvenile delinquency proceeding is
fundamentally different from a criminal proceeding and cannot be
equated to a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the sixth
amendment.” 140 In his concurring opinion, Justice White further
explained why he reached this conclusion. He stated that because the
malevolent acts of juveniles are considered to be mainly the
consequences of environmental pressures or other forces outside of their
control, they are “not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is
required to deter him or others.”141 When a court adjudicates juvenile
delinquent, it is reflective of a legislative choice “not to stigmatize the
juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal,” and his disposition is
“aimed at rehabilitation, not at convincing the juvenile of his error
simply by imposing pains and penalties.”142
The Supreme Court of Ohio has chosen to deny juveniles certain
procedural protections as well. In holding that the State was not
obligated to provide juveniles with a jury trial, the court concluded that
the very existence of the juvenile court “reflects the considered opinion
of society that childish pranks and other youthful indiscretions, as well
as graver offenses, should seldom warrant adult sanctions and that the
decided emphasis should be upon individual, corrective treatment.”143

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
Id. at 28.
McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009).
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552.
Id.
In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (Ohio 1969).
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Therefore, certain procedural protections are not required under due
process of law because “[t]he very purpose of the Juvenile Code is to
avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and insulate them from the
reputation and answerability of criminals.”144
Because of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system,
courts have determined that delinquency hearings do not require the
same level of protection as criminal courts.145 Although juveniles must
be afforded some procedural protections in delinquency hearings, the
established due process standard for juvenile proceedings is
“fundamental fairness.”146
Imposing a punitive, criminal, and sometimes mandatory sanction in
a juvenile court that lacks the protections that would be afforded to adult
defendants is clearly and fundamentally unfair. After the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Williams, it is incontestable that
requiring juveniles to register as sex offenders is a punitive
disposition.147 A youth adjudicated delinquent for a sex crime may
spend less time in a juvenile facility than an adult offender would in
prison, a juvenile sex offender could be required to register every 90
days for the rest of his life.148 The enormity of this punishment makes it
difficult to see the alleged fundamental differences between a
delinquency hearing and a criminal proceeding.149 In fact, if one
considers the enhanced devastation that registration causes to the lives
of young people, juvenile courts that require children to register actually
impose harsher punishments than criminal courts, while providing the
youth with fewer procedural protections.
Additionally, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Ohio have indicated that a central purpose of the
juvenile justice system is to avoid exposing the youth to the societal
stigmatization caused by a criminal record.150 However, requiring
juveniles to register as sex offenders not only stigmatizes them as
criminals, but announces to their community that they are one of the
most abhorred criminals in society: a sex offender. This public
humiliation and denunciation flies in the face of the rehabilitative
philosophy of the juvenile court. A juvenile court cannot maintain that
its “very purpose is to avoid treatment of youngsters as criminals and

144. Id. at 814.
145. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
146. Id. at 543.
147. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011).
148. JUVENILE DIVISION, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER, OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE PROVISIONS OF
SENATE BILL 10 3.
149. See, e.g., People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 909 N.E.2d 783, 796 (Ill. 2009).
150. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 552; see In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d 808, 814 (Ohio 1969).
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insulate them from the reputation . . . of criminals,”151 while at the same
time branding some juveniles as sex offenders for the rest of their lives.
Finally, requiring courts to classify mandatory registrants unfairly
denies youth the “individual, corrective treatment” that they should be
provided in the juvenile justice system.152 In denying juveniles
procedural protections such as a jury trial, courts have attempted to
preserve the rehabilitative and individualized approach of the juvenile
court by keeping it separate from the world of adversarial criminal trials.
However, when youth face the possibility of lifelong registration based
solely on the offense they committed, no court can argue that they are
receiving a treatment plan that is individually tailored to rehabilitate
them. Rather, they are being punished by a one-size-fits-all scheme
without the full protection granted other criminal defendants.
Juvenile sex offender registration is fundamentally unfair and
therefore violates a youth’s right to due process of law. Juvenile sex
offenders face the same punitive registration requirements as adult
offenders, but without the full scope of constitutional protections
afforded to criminal defendants. Sex offender registration is not a
rehabilitative measure, and stigmatizes youth even more than a criminal
record for nonsexual crime would. Therefore, the justifications for the
limited protections offered in juvenile court do not exist in sex offender
cases, and imposing registration requirements under such circumstances
does not promote a juvenile’s due process right to “fundamental
fairness.”153 If the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court, neither should the condition of being a juvenile sex offender.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although State v. Williams does not specifically address juvenile sex
offenders, it has many implications on registration requirements for
children who are adjudicated delinquent on the basis of a sex offense.
Because the holding in State v. Williams clearly states that the
registration requirements of Revised Code Chapter 2950 are punitive
measures, and not merely remedial in nature, applying these punitive
restrictions to juvenile delinquents violates the rehabilitative spirit of the
juvenile justice system. This priority of rehabilitation is not simply a
historical perspective, but it is a philosophy that has recently been
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, imposing such
harsh, criminal sanctions without the protection of a jury trial could raise
many constitutional issues, including violations of the child’s right to
151. In re Agler, 249 N.E.2d at 814.
152. Id. at 810.
153. McKeiver v. Penn., 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
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due process of law. Ohio’s juvenile defenders should explore all of
these arguments as part of zealously advocating on behalf of their
clients.
In conclusion, although State v. Williams deals solely with an adult
sex offender, it could have revolutionary effects on juvenile sex
offenders. At the very least, Ohio defenders have more ammunition
with which to protect their clients from long-term stigmatization and
humiliation through sex offender registration. Ohio legislatures should
also reconsider the constitutionality and legitimacy of imposing
punitive, criminal sanctions on juvenile sex offenders. Children who
come into the juvenile justice system are meant to be rehabilitated and
transformed into productive members of society; not stigmatized and
disparaged for years to come.
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